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JURISDICTION OF JUSTICES' COURTS
JURISDICTION OF JUSTICES' COURTS IN ACTIONS OF
ATTACHMENT IN THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS
BY CARL WHEATON
Just what is the history of the law relating to the territorial
jurisdiction of Justices' Courts in attachment cases in the City
of St. Louis? What is that jurisdiction today? One might well
expect to find several cases decided by appellate courts of the
state during the last half century dealing with the answers to
those questions, but a thorough search of the authorities will
bring to light but a single utterance in the whole jurisprudence
of Missouri which deals directly with them. That statement,
which is merely a dictum, is found in Hasler et al. v. Schoop et
al.,' decided April 20, 1897, by the St. Louis Court of Appeals.
In that case the plaintiffs were suing to set aside a judgment
obtained against them by the defendants, a judgment which they
claimed was based upon an attachment action which had no
proper foundation, since in said action reliance was placed upon
their non-residence, whereas they were residents. The petition,
however, admits that the action was brought before the proper
court. As to that point, the facts were that the action was
brought before the justice of the peace within and for the sev-
enth district of the City of St. Louis. The property attached
was in the City of St. Louis, but neither the facts nor the record
state in what district of the City it was located.
In passing upon the matter of jurisdiction, the court 2 made
the following statement:
It is admitted in plaintiffs' petition, and such is the law,
that the justice of the peace, who rendered the judgment
complained of in the attachment suit, had jurisdiction of the
subject-matter. This is so because all suits before justices
by attachment "shall be brought before a justice of the
township wherein the property, credits or effects of the de-
fendants, or either of them, may be found, or in any adjoin-
ing township thereto, or in the township wherein the de-
fendant resides, or in any adjoining township." R. S. 1889,
'70 Mo. A. 469.
'70 Mo. A. 1. c. 474.
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Sec. 6127. In the case at bar the attached effects were in
the City of St. Louis and the justice before whom the action
was brought had jurisdiction coextensive with that city.
Acts of 1893, p. 103; Gazollo v. McCann, 63 Mo. App. 414.
Hence the levy upon the goods vested him with full jurisdic-
tion of the subject-matter. -Godman v. Gordon, 61 Mo.
App. 691, and cases cited.
The conclusion of the court seems to be that any justice of the
City of St. Louis has jurisdiction in attachment actions if the
property is within the city limits.
The first statute quoted, which was Section 6127 of the Re-
vised Statutes of Missouri, 1889, if applied to the City of St.
Louis, would clearly lead to a different decision. In the case of
Gazollo v. McCann,3 the court states that in construing statutes
dealing with the jurisdiction of justices in townships, when
those statutes relate to the City of St. Louis, "township" should
be interpreted to refer to "districts" in St. Louis. Now, if we
change the word "township" to "district" in Section 6127 of the
Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1889, thus making it applicable to
the City of St. Louis, it will read as follows:
Sec. 6127. In cases of attachment.-Every action by at-
tachment shall be brought before a justice of the district
wherein the property, credits or effects of the defendants,
or either of them, may be found, or in any adjoining district
thereto, or in the district wherein the defendant resides, or
in any adjoining district.
Therefore, if said section was applied to the City of St. Louis,
attachment actions in Justices' Courts in St. Louis would have
to be brought before a justice of the district wherein the prop-
erty, credits or effects of the defendants, or either of them might
be found, or in any adjoining district thereto, or in the district
wherein the defendant resided, or in any adjoining district, and
could not, as stated in Hasler et al. v. Schopp et al., be brought
in any district in St. Louis, as long as the property attached was
within the city limits of St. Louis.
The court next refers to Acts of 1893, page 103. This statute,
part of which is found on page 103, is an act concerning sewers
and drains in Missouri cities which have special charters and
'63 Mo. A. 414, 417.
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which contain more than two thousand and less than thirty thou-
sand inhabitants and in cities of the third and fourth classes.
This obviously does not support the court's argument.
Turning our attention to Godman v. Gordon4 and cases men-
tioned therein, which the court in Hasler et al. v. Schopp et al.,
cited in support of its contention, we find those decisions do not
deal with the matter of the territorial jurisdiction of St. Louis
justices in attachment cases.
Let us examine the points involved in Godman v. Gordon.
They are as follows: First, an affidavit for an attachment in a
justice's court, though somewhat irregular in that the plaintiff's
agent who signed the affidavit was first named as plaintiff,
though later in said affidavit the proper person was named as
plaintiff, and in that the agent signing the affidavit was not des-
ignated in the affidavit as being an agent, was effective under
Section 587 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1889, which
outlined the essentials necessary to the action before justices.
This result was reached even though Section 526 of the Revised
Statutes of Missouri, 1889, which applied to affidavits in attach-
ment in circuit courts, required that when such affidavits were
signed by agents or attorneys for plaintiffs the fact that the af-
fiant was the plaintiff's agent or attorney should be stated in the
attachment affidavit. Nor did Section 604 of the Revised Stat-
utes of Missouri, 1889, change the result, though it provided that
the laws governing attachments in circuit courts should apply
to attachment proceedings before justices of the peace, so far as
the same might not be inconsistent with the provisions which
were specially applicable to justices. This result was reached
because Section 587 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1889,
which dealt specifically with affidavits in attachment actions be-
fore justices, did not require that an agent or attorney who sign-
ed the attachment affidavit in cases before justices should be
named as agent or attorney in such affidavit.
Second, an objection of a garnishee to the jurisdiction in the
original attachment proceeding stands on the same footing as
the objection of a third person questioning its validity collater-
ally. In attachment, jurisdiction is acquired by the levy of the
'61 Mo. A. 685.
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writ and is not ousted by the subsequent irregularity of the pub-
lication.r
Third, Section 6124 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1889,
providing that no justice of the peace shall have jurisdiction to
hear or try any action against an executor or administrator does
not apply to a garnishment proceeding against an executor or
administrator, because a garnishment is not a suit, but a mode
of sequestering credits to aid in the satisfaction of a judgment.
Fourth, a return which recited that the officer making said
return executed the writ to which his return was made by sum-
moning the garnishees and which further stated that he attached
money belonging to the defendant, which money was in the gar-
nishees' hands, was sufficient.
Fifth, if an amended return showed that the officer who made
the return had taken the necessary steps to confer jurisdiction
against garnishees before judgment was rendered in the gar-
nishment action, the amended return was sufficient, though the
amendment to the original return was not made until after the
cause was taken to the circuit court by appeal from a justice
court.
Without going into a detailed discussion of the various cases
cited in Godman v. Gordon, upon which cases the court in Hasler
et al. v. Schopp et.al., also relied to prove its point that any jus-
tice in St. Louis had territorial jurisdiction in an attachment
case, if the property involved was within the city limits of St.
Louis, it can be stated, after a careful perusal of those cases, that
though they support the points of law decided in Godman v. Gor-
don as outlined above, they do not in any manner deal with the
territorial jurisdiction of justices in St. Louis in attachment
cases.
Finally we come to the case of Gazollo v. McCann,6 decided in
1895 by the St. Louis Court of Appeals. The principal question
involved therein was one of territorial jurisdiction of a justice
court in the City of St. Louis. An action, brought in the City
of St. Louis to recover upon a promissory note, was begun before
a justice of a district in which neither the plaintiff nor the de-
fendant was resident. Moreover the action was not brought in
'Point 2 of syllabus.
Note 3, supra.
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a district adjoining the ones in which the plaintiff or defendant
resided, nor was defendant found in the district in which the
action was brought.
Sections 6125 and 6126 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri,
1889, became important to the decision of that case. They read
as follows:
Sec. 6125. Jurisdiction coextensive with county.-Every
justice of the peace shall have jurisdiction coextensive with
the county for which he shall be elected or appointed.
Sec. 6126. Suits, where commenced.-Every action rec-
ognizable before a justice of the peace shall be brought be-
fore some justice of the township, either: First, wherein
the defendants, or one of them, reside, or in any adjoining
township; or, second, wherein the plaintiff resides, and the
defendants, or one of them, may be found; third, if the de-
fendant is a non-resident of the county in which the plain-
tiff resides, the action may be brought before some justice
of any township in such country where the defendant may
be found; fourth, if the defendant is a non-resident of the
state, or has absconded from his usual place of abode, the
action may be brought before any justice in any county in
this state wherein defendant may be found; and, fifth, any
action against a railroad company for killing or injuring
horses, mules, cattle or other animals, shall be brought be-
fore a justice of the peace of the township in which the in-
jury happened, or in any a 'pining township.
In Bornschein v. FinckJ decided December 12, 1882, the stat-
utes just quoted were applied to a case before a justice in the City
of St. Louis, and "county" and "township," wherever found in
those statutes, were read "the City of St. Louis" and "district"
respectively. It was held that a single defendant resident in the
City of St. Louis could, in the ordinary action, be sued only in
the district in which the defendant resided, or in the district in
which the plaintiff resided and in which the defendant could be
found. The result was that Gazoilo v. McCann which was com-
menced in March, 1894, more than eleven years after the deci-
sion in Bornschein v. Finck, was begun in the wrong district if
the holding in Bornschein v. Finck was still authority in March,
1894, since the Gazolto case was, as will be recalled, originated
in none of the districts in which, according to the Bornschein
'13 Mo. A. 120.
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case, such an action (one to recover upon a promissory note)
might be commenced.
Shortly after the decision in Bornschein v. Finck (i.e., on
March 31, 1883) the State Legislature passed an act which is
found on page 103 of the Laws of Missouri, 1883, which pro-
vided:
Section 1. Justices of the peace in all cities in this state
having a population of one hundred thousand inhabitants or
more, shall have civil jurisdiction in all cases except land-
lords' summons cases, co-extensive with the limits or bound-
ary lines of such city, in the maximum amounts as now pre-
scribed by statute.
Section 2. All acts or parts of acts inconsistent or in con-
flict herewith are hereby repealed.
The court in Gazollo v. McCann decided that this statute of
1883 changed the former law which had been interpreted by
Bornschein v. Finck, supporting this conclusion by reference to
Clarkson v. Guernsey Furniture Co.8 The court in the latter
case, after stating that the law prior to 1883 was as set forth in
Bornsehein v. Finek, proceeded as follows:
"The question, then, is, whether the legislature, by the
act of 1883, above quoted, intended to change this rule. The
contention on behalf of the plaintiff is, that, whatever may
have been intended by those who procured the passage of
the act, the language of the act itself, properly construed,
does not import an intention to change the previously exist-
ing law. It is argued, that because there is a similar provi-
sion, giving justices jurisdiction co-extensive with the coun-
ty, in the Revised Statutes, which applies generally to jus-
tices throughout the state, the legislature, in enacting this
statute of 1883, must be understood to have intended noth-
ing more than, out of abundant caution, to extend the same
provision to the City of St. Louis. We are bound to sup-
pose that the legislature, in passing an act of this kind,
meant something, and we know that there never was any
substantial doubt about justices of the peace in the City of
St. Louis having jurisdiction analogous to, and equally ex-
tensive with, that possessed by justices of the peace in the
counties of the state. The construction contended for on
behalf of the plaintiff would, therefore, give to the act of
s 22 Mo. A. 109.
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1883 no meaning whatever. It is true that statutes relating
to the same subject must be construed in pari materia; but
it does not follow from this that the act of 1883 is to have no
greater force or effect than would be attained by transplant-
ing the provision of Section 2838, Revised Statutes, into the
City of St. Louis. The provisions are not identical in their
language. Section 2838, Revised Statutes, is drawn in the
most general terms, and the learned counsel for the plaintiff
justly states its meaning to be that justices of the peace are
to have jurisdiction co-extensive with the county, in the
sense that their subpoenas run to the whole county, that their
executions are enforceable throughout the whole county,
and that they are peace officers of the whole county. But it
does not in any manner touch upon or determine the ques-
tion, within what township actions commenced before jus-
tices of the peace shall be brought. The act of 1883, how-
ever, does not stop by saying, as Section 2838, Revised Stat-
utes, does, that justices of the peace in cities having one
hundred thousand inhabitants, or more, shall have jurisdic-
tion co-extensive with the city, but it says that they 'shall
have civil jurisdiction in all cases, except landlord's sum-
mons cases, co-extensive with the limits or boundary lines
of such city, in the maximum amounts as now prescribed
by statute.' This language can mean nothing less than
that they are to have jurisdiction of civil actions in the
maximum amounts now prescribed by law, throughout the
entire limits of the city within and for which they hold their
respective offices, with the exception stated. It would be
absurd to specify by using the word 'civil,' by excluding the
cases of landlords' summons, and by speaking, of 'the maxi-
mum amounts now prescribed by statute,' unless the legis-
lature intended to be understood as giving justices the jur-
isdiction named. The construction contended for by the
plaintiff, instead of transferring to the city the jurisdiction
which justices possess in the country, would, by implication,
narrow their jurisdiction in the city to a smaller jurisdic-
tion than they possess in the country."
The result of Gazollo v. McCann, therefore, was that justices
of St. Louis, at the time the action involved therein was begun,
had, except in proceedings by landlords' summons, jurisdiction
co-extensive with the limits of the city. This conclusion was
reached though the Revised Code of 1889 contained no section
similar to the Act of March 31, 1883. The court held that that
omission did not act as a repeal of the Act of 1883, since the
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mere omission of certain former statutory provisions from a
revision of the entire subject did not repeal those statutory pro-
visions, unless it distinctly appeared that the legislature either
revised them or re-enacted something in lieu thereof, citing Bird
v. Sellers9
This point relating to omissions in revisions of prior statutes
is not important to our discussion today, because again a statute
similar to the law of 1883, supra, is found in Section 2954 of the
Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1919, which reads as follows:
Sec. 2954. Jurisdiction, continued.-Every justice of the
peace shall have jurisdiction co-extensive with the city in
which he shall be elected, except in landlord and tenant
cases, and in cases of forcible entry and detainer and of un-
lawful detainer, which shall be brought in the district where
the property to be affected is situated: Provided, however,
that such cases may be instituted before a justice of the
peace in any district adjoining the district in which said
property is situated if the justice of the peace of the district
in which said property is situated has failed, by reason of
sickness, absence from the city or other cause, to hold court
for five days next preceding the date of the filing of the
statement or complaint in such suit; in such instances the
justice of the peace of such adjoining district shall have jur-
isdiction of all such cases so instituted before him to the
same extent as if said property were in his district; and a
statement of the fact that the justice of the peace in the dis-
trict where the property is situated has not held court for
five days next preceding the date of the filing of the state-
ment or complaint of such suit contained in the affidavit
filed by the plaintiff therein, shall be prima facie proof of
such fact.
Finally, what is the attitude of justices in the City of St. Louis
as to the territorial jurisdiction in attachment cases? It is that
any one of them has such jurisdiction in attachment actions as
long as the property involved is somewhere within the city.
What, in brief then, is the result of this investigation? It is
that we find but a single statement by any court of this state di-
rectly relating to the territorial jurisdiction of justices of the
City of St. Louis in attachment actions; that that statement is a
dictum; that prior to 1883 there was no special law applying to
122 Mo. 23, 30-32, 26 S. W. 668.
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the jurisdiction of St. Louis justices in attachment cases, and
that, therefore, Section 6127 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri,
1889, was applied to the justices of the peace in St. Louis, with
the result that attachment actions in St. Louis when brought be-
fore justices had to be brought before a justice of the district
wherein the property, credits or effects of the defendants, or
either of them might be found, or in any adjoining district there-
to, or in the district wherein the defendant resided, or in any
adjoining district; that in 1883 a law was passed relating spe-
cifically to the jurisdiction of St. Louis justices in attachment
actions, which, together with its successors, has been treated as
having changed the prior law so that today any justice in St.
Louis has territorial jurisdiction of any attachment action as
long as the property involved is within the city limits of St.
Louis.
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